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The Federal Judiciary’s Role in Drug Law
Reform in an Era of Congressional Dysfunction
Erica Zunkel & Alison Siegler*
ABSTRACT
While state drug law reform is moving apace, federal drug law reform has
moved much more slowly. Many, including the Judicial Conference of the
United States and the United States Sentencing Commission, have urged
Congress to enact substantive federal drug law reform for years. But
Congress has not acted. As a result, the federal system continues to single
out drug offenses for harsh treatment at the bail stage and the sentencing
stage—the front end and back end of the federal mass incarceration crisis.
In this paper, we argue that federal judges have a critical role to play in
future federal drug law reform in light of Congress’ long-standing failures
to meaningfully change the laws. At the front end, judges should
encourage the release of more people on bail by closely scrutinizing
prosecutors’ motions for temporary detention and giving little weight to
the Bail Reform Act’s presumption of detention. Data shows that the
statutory drug presumption is overbroad and does a poor job of
determining who is a risk of flight or a danger to the community. At the
back end, judges should issue categorical policy disagreements with the
drug sentencing guidelines and the career offender sentencing guideline
using the Supreme Court’s blueprint in Kimbrough v. United States.
Judges should issue sentences below these guidelines because they are not
based on empirical evidence, over-punish drug offenses, and result in
racial disparities. At both ends, judges should rest their decisions on the
evidence that the drug presumption, the drug sentencing guidelines, and
the career offender sentencing guideline are flawed. While judicial action
is not a cure for Congressional inaction, it would send a clear message
from one co-equal branch of government to another that substantive
reform is urgently needed.
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I. INTRODUCTION
From progressive prosecutors diverting drug cases out of the criminal legal
system to the elimination of mandatory minimums and three strikes laws, drug law
reform in the states is having a moment. Some have even gone so far as to suggest
that the War on Drugs is coming to an end.1 Federal drug law reform has moved
much more slowly.2 To be sure, there has been modest progress. In late 2018,
President Donald Trump signed the First Step Act (“FSA”) into law—the most
significant reform of our federal drug laws since Congress passed the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act in 1986 (“1986 Act”). Among other things, the FSA reduced the
draconian recidivist enhancements for federal drug offenses, expanded the “safety
valve” so judges have more latitude to sentence low-level, nonviolent drug offenders
below the mandatory minimum,3 and mandated correctional reform and
rehabilitative programming in the Bureau of Prisons.4
While these reforms made some progress, they simply tinker around the edges
and do not come close to ending the War on Drugs or solving the federal mass
incarceration crisis. Many, including the Judicial Conference of the United States
and the United States Sentencing Commission, have urged Congress to enact more
sweeping reforms for years. But Congress has not acted. In the meantime, the federal
system’s decades-long obsession with singling out people charged and convicted of
drug offenses for harsh treatment continues.
The federal system’s preoccupation with drug offenses has significant
consequences at the bail stage and the sentencing stage—the front end and back end
of the federal mass incarceration crisis.
Federal law treats drug offenses harshly from the outset, starting at a person’s
initial appearance before a federal judge. The Bail Reform Act (“BRA”)—passed at
the height of the War on Drugs in the 1980s—allows prosecutors to move to
temporarily detain almost anyone who is charged with a drug offense until a

1

See Alex Kreit, Drug Truce, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 1323, 1324 (2016) (describing efforts by
President Barack Obama’s drug “czars” to retire the War on Drugs “concept”); Nicholas Kristof,
Seattle Has Figured Out How to End the War on Drugs, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/23/opinion/sunday/opioid-crisis-drug-seattle.html.
2
See, e.g., Kara Gotsch, Breakthrough in U.S. Drug Sentencing Reform: The Fair Sentencing
Act and the Unfinished Reform Agenda, WOLA 1, 1 (Nov. 2011), https://www.wola.org/
sites/default/files/downloadable/Drug%20Policy/2011/FSA/WOLA_RPT_FSA-Eng_FNL-WEB.pdf.
(“The Fair Sentencing Act was welcomed by civil rights and community activists, but the compromise
measure fell short of the changes they had sought for two decades.”).
3

The changes to the recidivist enhancements and the “safety valve” are prospective only and
do not provide relief to those who were sentenced prior to the Act’s passage. First Step Act of 2018,
Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 756, 132 Stat. 5194, 5221 (2018).
4

See id.
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detention hearing.5 At the detention hearing, the BRA mandates a presumption that
those same people be detained throughout the case based on dangerousness, even
though they are presumed innocent.6 The BRA’s provisions favoring pretrial
detention in drug cases are outdated relics of the War on Drugs and should be
eliminated. Data shows that the drug presumption does not accurately predict which
arrestees pose a flight risk or a danger to the community, the two pillars of the BRA.
The federal judiciary has already voiced its opposition to the drug presumption,
which alone should be a clarion call to judges to exercise their discretion to release
people in presumption cases. In 2017, the Judicial Conference—chaired by Chief
Justice John Roberts—urged Congress to eliminate the presumption of detention in
most drug cases.7 The Judicial Conference reiterated this recommendation during
the COVID-19 pandemic and issued a broader call for federal bail reform: “Legal,
policy, and budgetary factors—including the presumption of innocence and the
relative costs of incarceration versus pretrial supervision—support reducing
unnecessary pretrial detention.”8 Congress’ inaction in the face of the judiciary’s
repeated calls for reform makes it all the more imperative that judges use their
discretion to counteract the unwarranted harshness of the presumption in drug cases.
Federal law also treats drug offenses harshly at the sentencing stage. The
majority of federal drug offenses carry mandatory minimum penalties that judges
must impose—no matter how compelling the case or mitigating the circumstances—
unless the person provides “substantial assistance” or qualifies for the “safety
valve.”9 Like the BRA, Congress passed these laws in the 1980s, when fear about
5

18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(C) provides that prosecutors can move for temporary detention in any
case that involves “an offense for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is
prescribed in the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.), the Controlled Substances Import
and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 951 et seq.), or chapter 705 of Title 46 [46 USCS § 70501 et seq.].” 18
U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(C) (2008). This encompasses nearly all federal drug offenses.
6

See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(A) (2008).

7

See REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 10–
11 (Sept. 2017), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/17-sep_final_0.pdf [hereinafter JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE REPORT].
8
See Letter from the Judicial Conference of the United States to the House and Senate
Appropriations Committees, Enclosure 2 at 2 (Apr. 28, 2020), [hereinafter 2020 Judicial Conference
Letter].
9
Approximately 66% of all drug trafficking cases in Fiscal Year 2019 carried a mandatory
minimum penalty. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN DRUG
TRAFFICKING
CASES—FISCAL
YEAR
2019
122,
Figure
D-2
(2019),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-andsourcebooks/2019/FigureD2.pdf. Of those cases, 42.2% received no relief from the mandatory
minimum penalty at all, while 17% received relief for providing “substantial assistance” and 31%
received relief for satisfying the requirements for the “safety valve.” Id. Prosecutors “have virtually
total discretion to make one or both motions.” Mark W. Bennett, A Slow Motion Lynching? The War
on Drugs, Mass Incarceration, Doing Kimbrough Justice, and a Response to Two Third Circuit Judges,
66 RUTGERS L. REV. 873, 885 (2014).
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crime and drugs was at its apex. While mandatory minimums have been roundly
criticized across the political spectrum and there is clear evidence they do not work,10
they remain on the books because Congress has not mustered the political will to
meaningfully reform or eliminate them.
Beyond the mandatory minimums, people charged with federal drug offenses
often face even higher sentences under the drug sentencing guidelines, which
primarily focus on drug type and quantity in setting the punishment.11 Finally, if
someone charged with a drug offense has been convicted of more than one felony
drug offense in the past, they face a still-higher sentence under the career offender
sentencing guideline, even though the Sentencing Commission recently urged
Congress to amend the law to exclude “drug trafficking only” career offenders.12
The statistics highlight how the laws that apply to drug cases at bail and
sentencing have contributed to mass incarceration and racial injustice. Today, drug
offenses make up nearly 30% of the federal docket nationwide.13 From 1990 to 2008,
that percentage was even higher—varying from approximately 35% to as high as
47%.14 In contrast, when the BRA and the 1986 Act were enacted, drug offenses

10
See, e.g., The Pew Charitable Trusts, Federal Drug Sentencing Laws Bring High Cost, Low
Return, 3–4 (Aug. 27, 2015), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issuebriefs/2015/08/federal-drug-sentencing-laws-bring-high-cost-low-return
(despite
decades
of
mandatory minimum drug laws, drug prices have declined while drug use and purity have increased);
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 66 (2002),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/drugtopics/200205-rtc-cocaine-sentencing-policy/200205_Cocaine_and_Federal_Sentencing_Policy.pdf
(“The declining prices for powder cocaine during the period of increasing penalties appear inconsistent
with a deterrent effect of federal cocaine penalties.”); Eduardo Porter, Numbers Tell of Failure in Drug
War, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/04/business/in-rethinking-thewar-on-drugs-start-with-the-numbers.html; Tanya Golash-Boza, America’s Mass Incarceration
Problem in 5 Charts—or, Why Sessions Shouldn’t Bring Back Mandatory Minimums, THE
CONVERSATION (May 29, 2017), https://theconversation.com/americas-mass-incarceration-problemin-5-charts-or-why-sessions-shouldnt-bring-back-mandatory-minimums-78019.
11
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(c) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018)
(drug quantity table).
12
See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: CAREER OFFENDER SENTENCING
ENHANCEMENTS (2016), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimonyand-reports/criminal-history/201607_RtC-Career-Offenders.pdf [hereinafter 2016 CAREER OFFENDER
REPORT].
13
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2019 ANNUAL REPORT AND SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL
SENTENCING STATISTICS 45 (2019), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-andpublications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2019/2019-Annual-Report-and-Sourcebook.pdf
[hereinafter 2019 ANNUAL REPORT].
14
See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SOURCEBOOK ARCHIVES, https://www.ussc.gov
/research/sourcebook/archive. The online Archives start in 1996. Pre-1996 statistics are found in the
Commission’s Annual Reports. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORTS ARCHIVES,
https://www.ussc.gov/about/annual-report/archive.
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constituted just 18% of the federal docket,15 and fraud and regulatory crimes
dominated.16 At the bail stage, judges detain people charged with drug offenses at
an astonishingly high rate. A 2017 government study found that the presumption of
detention applied in 93% of all federal drug cases, even though it was intended to
apply to rich drug traffickers who could buy their way out of jail.17 From 1995 to
2010, the percentage of people charged with federal drug offenses who were jailed
while awaiting trial increased from 76% to 84%.18 At the back end, at sentencing, it
is a virtual certainty that anyone convicted of a federal drug offense will spend time
behind bars: 96.3% of drug offenders were sentenced to prison in Fiscal Year 2019
and approximately 66% were convicted of an offense that carried a mandatory
minimum penalty.19 The average sentence was 76 months, but varied by drug type.20
These trends have remained stable over time.21
Moreover, in the years since the BRA and the 1986 Act were passed, people of
color have borne the brunt of these harsh federal drug laws. At the bail stage, people
of color are detained before trial at a higher rate than whites, even after controlling
for other factors that are predictive of detention or release.22 At the sentencing stage,
troubling racial disparities exist as well. The most recent Sentencing Commission
data shows that in Fiscal Year 2019, fully 75% of those sentenced for federal drug
offenses were people of color: 44.3% were Hispanic and 27.4% were Black.23 By

15
Administration of Bail by State and Federal Courts: A Call for Reform: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. On Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 115th
Cong. 16 (2019), https://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU08/20191114/110194/HHRG-116-JU08Wstate-SieglerA-20191114.pdf [hereinafter Siegler Written Statement] (citing John Scalia, Federal
Drug Offenders, 1999 with Trends 1984–99, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics Special
Report at 1 (Aug. 2001), https://www.Csdp.org/research/fdo99.pdf) (Written Statement of Alison
Siegler).
16
Thomas H. Cohen & Amaryllis Austin, Examining Federal Pretrial Release Trends Over the
Last Decade, 82 FED. PROBATION 3, 4 (2018).
17
See Amaryllis Austin, The Presumption for Detention Statute’s Relationship to Release
Rates, 81 FED. PROBATION 52, 55 (2017).
18

Id. at 53.

19
2019 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 62, Table 13, 122, Figure D-2. The 96.3% figure
excludes the 563 people convicted of drug possession—a rare charge in the federal system. Id. at 62.
20

Id. at 64, Table 15.

21

See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SOURCEBOOK ARCHIVES, https://www.ussc.gov/research/
sourcebook/archive.
22

Stephanie Holmes Didwania, Discretion and Disparity in Federal Detention, 115 NW. U.L.
REV. (forthcoming 2021) (detailing the results of an empirical study of 300,000 federal cases from
2002 to 2016).
23

2019 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 110, Table D-2.
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comparison, the general population is 18.5% Hispanic and 13.4% Black.24 Data also
shows that people of color ultimately face longer prison terms than whites arrested
for the same offenses with the same prior records.25 For example, the Sentencing
Commission recently found that when Black men and White men commit the very
same crime, Black men on average receive a sentence that is nearly 20% longer.26
Some of this is certainly a result of mandatory minimum charging, which
“introduces sizeable racial disparities” into the system.27 Data also shows that Black
people who are convicted of a federal drug offense carrying a mandatory minimum
are least likely to receive a sentence below the minimum.28
In this paper, we argue that federal judges have a critical role to play in future
federal drug law reform in light of Congress’ long-standing failures to meaningfully
change the laws. Judges can use their considerable discretion at both stages to
counteract the unwarranted harshness of these laws and ameliorate the racial
disparities. At both ends, judges should emphasize the evidence that the pretrial drug
presumption, the drug sentencing guideline, and the career offender sentencing
guideline are flawed.29 While judicial action is not a cure for Congress’ inaction, it

24
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, QUICK FACTS 2019, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/
US/PST045219.
25
See Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Racial Disparity in Federal Criminal Sentences, 122
J. POL. ECON. 1320, 1349 (2014); Written Submission of the American Civil Liberties Union on Racial
Disparities in Sentencing: Hearing on Reports of Racism in the Justice System of the United States,
153rd Session Inter-Am. Comm’n on Hum. Rts 1, 1–2 (2014) [hereinafter ACLU Written Submission];
Bennett, supra note 9, at 881–82 (chronicling the demographics of crack cocaine defendants in federal
court and noting that “[n]early 83% of the . . . crack defendants sentenced in 2012 were black”).
26
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES IN SENTENCING: AN UPDATE TO THE
2012 BOOKER REPORT 2 (2017), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publication
s/research-publications/2017/20171114_Demographics.pdf.
27

Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity: Assessing
the Role of Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker, 123 YALE L.J. 2, 10 (2013) (“Our research suggests
that prosecutorial decisions are important sources of [racial] disparity—especially the decision to file
mandatory minimum charges, which are prosecutors’ most powerful tools for constraining judges.”).
28
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 8 (2017), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/
research-publications/2017/20171025_Drug-Mand-Min.pdf [hereinafter 2017 MANDATORY MINIMUM
REPORT].
29
In 2015, Federal District Judge Jed Rakoff called for judges to speak out about mass
incarceration, mandatory minimums, and the sentencing guidelines. “What is called for in such
circumstances is leadership: those whom the public does respect should point out why statutes
prescribing mandatory minimums, draconian guidelines, and the like are not the solution to controlling
crime, and why, in any case, the long-term price of mass incarceration is too high to pay, not just in
economic terms, but also in terms of shared social values.” Jed S. Rakoff, Mass Incarceration: The
Silence of the Judges, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (May 15, 2015), https://www.nybooks.com/
articles/2015/05/21/mass-incarceration-silence-judges/.
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would send a clear message from one co-equal branch of government to another that
substantive reform is urgently needed.30
At the front end, judges should encourage the pretrial release of more people
by closely scrutinizing prosecutors’ motions for temporary detention at the initial
appearance stage and giving little weight to the drug presumption of detention at the
detention hearing stage.
At the back end, judges should issue categorical policy disagreements with the
drug sentencing guidelines and the career offender sentencing guideline using the
Supreme Court’s blueprint in Kimbrough v. United States.31 These guidelines are
not based on empirical evidence and national experience, and therefore do not
exemplify the Sentencing Commission’s “exercise of its characteristic institutional
role.”32 Accordingly, they warrant less respect and adherence than other guidelines.
This article proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses the front-end problem—the
Bail Reform Act of 1984s provisions that favor pretrial detention for people charged
with federal drug offenses. Part II discusses the back-end problem—the history of
drug mandatory minimums and the drug sentencing guidelines, including the career
offender guideline. Part III discusses attempts to reform the federal pretrial detention
system and federal drug laws and situates them within current efforts to reform the
criminal legal system. Part IV concludes by discussing how judges can advance
reform at bail and sentencing.
II. THE BAIL REFORM ACT OF 1984’S MISGUIDED FOCUS ON FEDERAL DRUG
OFFENSES
The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution mandates that “[e]xcessive bail
shall not be required.”33 Congress enacted the first federal bail provision as part of
the Judiciary Act of 1789, and for nearly 200 years, the federal bail system “was
premised on a defendant’s right to bail for all non-capital offenses if the defendant
could post sufficient sureties.”34 But because release was based on a person’s
financial resources, people who were indigent had few options for release.35 Those
30

Id. (“[W]hile this treatment is mandated by the legislature, it is we judges who mete it out.
Unless we judges make more effort to speak out against this inhumanity, how can we call ourselves
instruments of justice?”).
31

552 U.S. 85 (2007).

32

Id. at 109.

33

U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.

34
Austin, supra note 17, at 52; see also Alexa Van Brunt & Locke E. Bowman, Toward a Just
Model of Pretrial Release: A History of Bail Reform and a Prescription for What’s Next, 108 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 701, 710 (2018) (“In the colonial era, bail was generally synonymous with
release.”).
35
Austin, supra note 17, at 52; see also Van Brunt & Bowman, supra note 34, at 724 (“Bail
reform gained momentum throughout the decade. The National Conference on Bail and Criminal
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concerns led to the passage of the Bail Reform Act of 1966, which created a
presumption of release without financial conditions and focused a judge’s bail
determination on non-appearance for court hearings.36 Dangerousness was not a
consideration.37
The Bail Reform Act of 1966 was “a progressive step forward” because it
“disfavored wealth-based distinctions” and highlighted “the importance of
individualized decision-making” at the bail stage.38 As a result, pretrial release rates
increased throughout the 1970s.39 This progress was temporary, however, as the
country “entered an era defined by tough-on-crime rhetoric and related legislative
action.”40 In the 1980s, legislators became myopically focused on violent crime and
keeping violent offenders off the streets.41 For example, Senator Lawton Chiles
referred to a “crime wave” that diminished the public’s confidence “in the ability of
our courts to deal with criminals,” during hearings on the BRA.42 He traced the
public’s supposed lack of confidence to the bail system: “[T]he way it operates today
does as much as any other criminal justice procedure to foster that lack of confidence
in our courts.”43 He urged Congress to pass bail reform that permitted judges to
consider dangerousness.44 The Department of Justice took the same position.45
That view won out, and the federal bail framework changed dramatically with
Congress’ passage of the BRA in 1984, at the height of the War on Drugs. Instead
of focusing solely on whether a person posed a risk of flight, the BRA permitted
Justice, held in the spring of 1964, focused on alternatives to money bail with the purpose of eliminating
the intentional detention of the poor.”).
36
Austin, supra note 17, at 52; Federal Bail Procedures Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Constitutional Rights and the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Committee
on the Judiciary United States Senate, 89th Cong. 5, 33 (1965) (text of s. 1357).
37

See Austin, supra note 17, at 52.

38

Van Brunt & Bowman, supra note 34, at 725–26.

39

See id. at 725.

40

See id. at 730.

41

See id. at 731.

42

Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Committee on the Judiciary,
97th Cong. 59 (1981), at 56 [hereinafter 1981 Hearings] (Statement of Hon. Lawton Chiles, a U.S.
Senator from the State of Florida).
43

Id.

44

Id. at 57.

45

Id. at 156 (Statement of Jeffrey Harris, Deputy Associate Attorney General of the United
States) (testifying that in order “to provide an adequate mechanism to deal with the dangerous
defendants who are seeking release,” courts “must be given the authority to order the detention of those
defendants who are so dangerous that no condition of release will reasonably assure the safety of the
community or other persons”).
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judges to consider future dangerousness when making a release decision.46 The
Supreme Court concluded that the BRA was constitutional even with the new focus
on dangerousness, emphasizing that release was the “norm” and detention “the
carefully limited exception.”47
The BRA made two important changes that target people charged with drug
offenses for pretrial detention. At the initial appearance stage, the BRA authorizes
mandatory temporary detention at the government’s request.48 At the detention
hearing stage, the BRA mandates a rebuttable presumption that the person be
detained throughout the case.49 Both provisions apply to any drug offense that carries
a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more. Virtually all federal drug
offenses subject individuals to these heightened detention standards. They apply to
all offenses involving a hard drug and any marijuana offense involving 50 or more
kilograms, and they apply without regard to a person’s role, culpability in the
offense, or lack of prior convictions.50 Thus, these detention provisions sweep up
alleged drug kingpins and low-level mules alike, and fall as heavily on first offenders
as on those with long rap sheets.51
The drug presumption has had a significant impact on pretrial detention in
federal drug cases. The fact that the presumption applied in 93% of all federal drug
cases52 is a direct consequence of the 1980s anti-drug sentiment: “[T]he
presumptions were . . . created in the midst of the ‘War on Drugs’; therefore, the
cases targeted by these presumptions were largely drug offenses.”53 The
presumption has also resulted in extremely high detention rates. While just 16% of
people charged with federal drug offenses were released pretrial in 2013,54 people
charged with state-level felony drug offenses in large urban areas were released 65%

46
Austin, supra note 17, at 53; see also Marc Miller & Martin Guggenheim, Pretrial Detention
and Punishment, 75 MINN. L. REV. 335, 346 (1990) (“The Bail Reform Act of 1984 makes protection
of the public the pivotal factor in determining whether to release or detain federal defendants.”).
47

United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).

48

See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(C) (2008).

49

See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(A) (2008).

50

See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b), 960(b) (2018).

51
See Siegler Written Statement, supra note 15, at 17; Reevaluating the Effectiveness of
Mandatory Minimum Sentences: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 225–26
(2013) (Written Statement of the Federal Criminal Justice Clinic at the University of Chicago Law
School).
52

Austin, supra note 17, at 55.

53

Cohen & Austin, supra note 16, at 4.

54

Austin, supra note 17, at 53.
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of the time in 2009.55 These state release rates are likely to be even higher today
given the bail reform movement sweeping the country.56
While much has been written about the BRA generally, the legislative history
of the drug presumption of detention has not been explored in depth. That debate is
illustrative of just how far the presumption has strayed from its original purpose. A
close look at the BRA’s legislative history demonstrates that Congress did not intend
the drug presumption to apply so broadly. Rather, legislators wanted the drug
presumption to prevent rich people suspected of high-level drug trafficking from
fleeing to avoid prosecution.57 When the BRA was debated, drug prosecutions were
not nearly as prevalent as they are today and therefore the drug presumption would
not have affected “a majority of cases.”58 Of course, as drug prosecutions increased
exponentially over the next decades, the presumption became more central to
detention decisions.59
As legislators debated changes to the BRA that would favor pretrial detention
in drug cases, they used hyperbolic language to describe the country’s drug problem.
That language reflected the 1980s War on Drugs mentality.60 Senator Lawton Chiles,
who hailed from Florida, stated that the BRA required “specially crafted” provisions
to “ensure that those who are responsible for the drug problem which has swept this
country are brought to justice.”61 Senator Orrin Hatch, without citing any evidence,
contended that bail reform in drug cases was needed because drug offenders
“historically abused bail proceedings more than most criminal offenders.”62
Senator Chiles was one of the most forceful proponents for adding a
presumption of detention in drug cases.63 He believed that drug trafficking cases
posed a “special problem” because of “a revolving door situation” where people
55
Brian A. Reaves, Federal Defendants in Large Urban Counties, 200—Statistical Tables,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics, at 15 (Dec. 2013), https://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/fdluc09.pdf.
56

Stephanie Wykstra, Bail Reform, Which Could Save Millions of Unconvicted People From
Jail, Explained, VOX (Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2018/10/17/17955306/bailreform-criminal-justice-inequality.
57
This idea stems from discussions with Jennesa Calvo-Friedman of the American Civil
Liberties Union.
58

Cohen & Austin, supra note 16, at 4.

59

Id.

60

See, e.g., Eric E. Sterling, The Sentencing Boomerang: Drug Prohibition Politics and
Reform, 40 VILL. L. REV. 383, 398 (1995) (discussing how by the 1980s “the hyperbole of the ‘drug
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were released on bond and then failed to appear in court.64 He used his own state of
Florida as an example. He claimed that the “massive invasion of illicit drugs” there
enabled drug dealers to reap proceeds from $7 billion to $10 billion a year.65 Such
large amounts of cash meant that “no matter how high bail is set, the drug smuggler
who has been arrested will make bail” and “will never appear in court.”66 For these
“drug smuggler[s],” bail forfeiture was “no more than a temporary business loss.”67
Accordingly, Chiles believed that allowing judges to consider dangerousness at the
bond stage was not enough to “solve the special problem of drug dealers” and
insisted that legislators also add a presumption of detention.68
Chiles explained that a presumption of detention would establish “special
considerations” for bail in drug cases that would “go a long way toward closing that
revolving door and would help assure that drug dealers who are arrested are brought
to justice.”69 The presumption would operate so that the person “should not be given
bail unless he could show mitigating factors.”70 Chiles believed that the presumption
of detention would provide judges with “more direction” in making bond
determinations in drug cases, ultimately “denying bail to drug dealers in many
instances.”71
Other legislators and the Department of Justice echoed Chiles’ concerns. The
Senate Judiciary Committee, chaired by Senator Strom Thurmond, argued that there
should be a presumption of detention for the “most serious” drug offenses because
it is “well known that drug trafficking is carried on to an unusual degree by persons
engaged in continuing patterns of criminal activity” and they “have both the
resources and foreign contacts to escape to other countries with relative ease.”72 In
his 1984 testimony, Deputy Attorney General James Knapp emphasized that
detention was appropriate for “major drug traffickers” because drug fugitives
outnumbered federal drug agents.73 He noted that some “drug figures” were “even
64
Id. at 57; see also JAMES FORMAN, JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN 127 (2017) (one of the reasons
the Black community in Washington, D.C. supported tougher drug laws in the 1980s was the perception
of “excessive leniency” at the bail stage).
65
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The Bail Reform Act of 1983: Report of the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate
on S. 215, 98th Cong., S. REP. NO. 98-147 (1983), at 46.
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Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of
Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 191 (1984), at 191 [hereinafter 1984 Hearings]
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adopting the practice of setting aside a portion of their illegal proceeds” to pay bail
forfeitures.74
The BRA’s legislative history shows that legislators were shortsighted about
the implications of the drug presumption. For his part, Knapp foreshadowed that the
drug presumption would apply even to those “without any prior record or evidence
of criminal history.”75 But that was not on legislators’ radar. By focusing on “major
drug traffickers” at a time when drug cases made up a small percentage of the federal
docket, legislators do not appear to have contemplated—or cared—that the drug
presumption would sweep too broadly.
Today, the problems with the drug presumption are clear and well
documented.76 The presumption applies equally to first offenders and people
charged with low-level, nonviolent drug offenses, it leads to high detention rates,
and falls most heavily on people of color. Judges have a responsibility to use their
discretion to mitigate these injustices.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF MANDATORY MINIMUMS AND SENTENCING
GUIDELINES FOR FEDERAL DRUG OFFENSES
As with the federal bail regime, the legislative, executive, and judicial branches
each has a hand in the federal sentencing regime. Congress passes laws that set
minimum and maximum penalties for drug offenses, prosecutors determine what
charges to file, and the Sentencing Commission—an independent agency housed in
the judicial branch—determines the sentencing guidelines that are the “starting
point” for judges at sentencing.77 But Congress’ laws, most notably mandatory
minimum sentencing statutes, ultimately trump the Commission’s guidelines. What

(Testimony of James I.K. Knapp, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Criminal Division, on Behalf of the U.S.
Department of Justice).
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supra note 73, at 313 (Letter of Deputy Assistant Attorney General James Knapp).
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follows is an overview of how mandatory minimums and the guidelines evolved and
how they operate in tandem and tension today.
A. The Controlled Substances Act & Federal Drug Mandatory Minimums
Drug mandatory minimums date back to the early twentieth century, and have
often been linked to fears about race and crime.78 The first mandatory minimum was
passed in 1914, when Congress set a five-year minimum for manufacturing opium
for smoking purposes.79 The law was influenced by widespread anti-Chinese
sentiment. For example, in 1902, the American Pharmaceutical Association’s
Committee on the Acquirement of the Drug Habit blamed Chinese immigrants for
“importing” opium smoking to the United States. The Committee concluded, “If the
Chinaman cannot get along without his ‘dope,’ we can get along without him.”80
More mandatory minimums followed until the 1970s when politicians began to
recognize that mandatory minimums were not working. Then-Congressman George
H.W. Bush spoke in favor of repealing mandatory minimum drug laws because it
would “result in better justice and more appropriate sentences.”81 The Controlled
Substances Act (“CSA”), passed in 1970, was a radical departure from prior drug
laws. It eliminated all mandatory minimums, except those relating to drug
kingpins.82 It also imposed a “unified legal framework” to regulate drugs.83 Under
the CSA, drugs were grouped “based on their accepted medical uses, the potential
for abuse, and their psychological and physical effects on the body.”84 Drugs in
Schedule 1, such as marijuana, cocaine, and methamphetamine, were categorized as
such because “of their high potential for abuse, lack of any accepted medical use,
and the absence of any accepted safety for use in medically supervised treatment.”85
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15 (2016).
79

See Harrison Narcotics Tax, Pub. L. No. 63-223, 38 Stat. 278 (1914).

80

JEFF GOLDBERG & DEAN LATIMER, FLOWERS

IN THE

BLOOD: THE STORY

OF

OPIUM 210

(2014).
81
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The purported objectives of the CSA were “to conquer drug abuse and to control the
legitimate and illegitimate traffic in controlled substances.”86
The pendulum swung back in favor of mandatory minimum sentencing with
the rise of the crack cocaine “epidemic.” Crack cocaine was widely seen as
devastating Black communities in urban cities.87 The media devoted story after story
to “crack babies” and “gangbangers.”88 The overdose death of basketball star Len
Bias—ironically from powder cocaine, not crack cocaine as first reported by the
media89—was all that it took for Congress to act, and overreact.90
With haste, Congress passed the 1986 Act, which established the framework
for the current federal mandatory minimum drug laws. The Act set five- and tenyear mandatory minimum sentences for most drug offenses based on the type and
quantity of the drug.91 Those mandatory minimums could be increased to 10 or 20
years if the person had been convicted of a felony drug offense in the past.92 Two
years later, legislators passed a three-strikes law for drugs: if a person was subject
to a 10-year mandatory minimum and had two prior drug convictions, the
government could seek a jaw-dropping mandatory minimum sentence of life.93 The
1986 Act also established the 100-to-1 crack/powder cocaine sentencing disparity
that was on the books until the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 reduced it to 18-to-1.94
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Forman, supra note 64, at 156 (“In the magnitude of the threat it posed to black America, the
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The original sin of drug sentencing is the 1986 Act’s reliance on drug type and
quantity to identify “‘major’ and ‘serious’ dealers.”95 That framework has failed
because drug type and quantity are often very bad proxies for culpability.96 In a 2011
report, the Commission wrote that “the quantity of drugs involved in an offense is
not as closely related to the offender’s function in the offense as perhaps Congress
expected.”97 More recently, the Commission observed that while Congress intended
the 1986 Act’s mandatory minimums to apply to high-level traffickers, they apply
disproportionately to low-level offenders instead.98
The federal judiciary has likewise spoken out against mandatory minimum drug
laws and their overemphasis on drug type and quantity. For example, in its 2013
letter to the Senate Judiciary Committee, the Judicial Conference outlined the
problems with the law’s misguided focus on drug type and quantity.99 Nonetheless,
the First Step Act made no changes to that core organizing principle of the 1986 Act.
B. The Sentencing Commission & the Formulation of the Sentencing Guidelines
With the exception of mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, for most of the
19th and 20th centuries, federal judges had near unlimited sentencing discretion.100
Around the same time that politicians like then-Congressman Bush were questioning
the wisdom of mandatory minimum sentences, prominent judges and academics
began to rail against the extent of judicial discretion and the perceived sentencing
disparities that resulted. Judge Marvin Frankel, called the “father of sentencing

unwarranted 100-to-1 disparity in the first place.”); see also Alexander, supra note 88, at 139 (“There
should be no disparity—the ratio should be one-to-one.”).
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Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 95.
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in the offense” are ineligible for “earned time credits” for participating in rehabilitative programming.
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reform,” led the charge to cabin judges’ sentencing discretion.101 He believed that
limiting discretion would promote sentencing uniformity and drastically reduce
disparities.102 While pre-guidelines sentencing disparities certainly existed, Judge
Frankel “did not foresee (or at least did not discuss) the possibility that written
sentencing rules could have the effect of transferring sentencing discretion [from
judges] to prosecutors.”103
Judge Frankel’s concerns about judicial discretion were heeded by those on
Capitol Hill and culminated in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (“SRA”). The
SRA drastically changed federal judges’ role in the sentencing process and curtailed
their discretion. The centerpiece of the SRA was the creation of the Commission,
which in turn authored the federal sentencing guidelines.
The Commission has several statutory purposes: (1) to establish “sentencing
policies and practices” that satisfy the § 3553(a) purposes of sentencing, including
avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities, while at the same time providing
“sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when warranted by
mitigating or aggravating factors” not accounted for by the guidelines; (2) to reflect
“advancement in knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal justice
process”; and (3) to “develop means of measuring the degree to which the
sentencing, penal, and correctional practices are effective in meeting the purposes
of sentencing” in § 3553(a)(2).104
The SRA established safeguards to ensure that the Commission employed an
empirical approach. It required the Commission to review and revise the guidelines
based on consultation with all the players in the system, including judges and experts
in the field.105 It also mandated collecting and systematizing data about the
sentencing process, the sentences judges impose, and the relationship between those
sentences and the § 3553(a) factors.106
As the Supreme Court observed in Rita, the Commission’s reliance on
empirical evidence and its review and revision of the guidelines over time in light
of judicial decisions, sentencing data, and consultation with participants and experts
are at the core of its characteristic institutional role.107 The Supreme Court saw this
iterative process as essential: “The Commission’s work is ongoing. The statutes and
the Sentencing Guidelines themselves foresee a continuous evolution helped by the
101
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sentencing courts and courts of appeals in that process.”108 One crucial aspect of this
process is that sentencing judges must articulate reasons for their sentences.109
Congress expected the Commission to take stock of data and past sentencing
practices in formulating the guidelines, and anticipated that guideline sentences
would be—on average—similar to pre-guidelines sentences in most cases.110 The
Commission began with an “empirical examination of 10,000 presentence reports
setting forth what judges had done in the past and then modifying and adjusting past
practice[.]”111 From there, the Commission incorporated “a vast array of heavily
weighted aggravating factors”112 and set its standard for when judges could sentence
below the guidelines, permitting downward departures only in “atypical” cases.113
The Commission did not explain why it chose to undervalue mitigating factors in
the guidelines.114 Moreover, it “did not estimate the impact of mitigating offender
characteristics on past sentences,” even though “judges had routinely considered
those factors.”115 As a result, there are real questions about whether the
Commission’s formulation of the guidelines was based on empirical evidence and
past practices, as Congress directed.116
The guidelines are a complex and rigid set of sentencing factors based on the
seriousness of the offense and the person’s criminal history. Each federal crime is
assigned a base offense level, which is the starting point for determining the
seriousness of the particular offense.117 In addition to the base offense levels, each
offense has specific offense characteristics that increase or decrease the base offense
level. There are also adjustments and departures, which similarly increase or
decrease the base offense level. The result of these calculations is the total offense
level. That is coupled with the person’s criminal history category—ranging from
one to six based on prior criminal history—to produce a guidelines range in months.
There are also recidivist sentencing provisions, like the career offender guideline,
108
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which override offense-specific guidelines and set the offense level based on the
offense’s maximum penalty.118 The guidelines undervalue mitigating factors and
give them little role at sentencing.119
Congress requires judges to communicate regularly with the Commission about
the sentences they impose. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(w), the Chief Judge of every
federal district must submit to the Commission, within thirty days following the
entry of judgment, a report of the sentence.120 The report must include “the written
statement of reasons for the sentence imposed (which shall include the reason for
any departure from the otherwise applicable guideline range . . . . ).”121 Judges may
also, of course, issue written opinions that explain their decisions.
C. The Booker “Revolution” and Kimbrough
Before United States v. Booker rendered the guidelines advisory, it was
virtually mandatory for judges to sentence people within the applicable guideline
range. If the sentencing judge misapplied the guidelines or departed from the range
for any reason beyond those allowed for by the guidelines, appellate judges were on
hand to “police” them.122 With looming appellate review, the Commission’s
“proclamations were not merely ‘guidelines’ or recommendations, but enforceable
rules that sentencing judges were legally obliged to follow.”123 In essence, the
Commission “micromanage[d] the sentencing function of federal [sentencing]
judges,” And the courts of appeals did the same.124
Judges frequently expressed their displeasure at the rigidity of the guidelines,
in ways similar to their frustration with mandatory minimums. An article in the
Baltimore Sun in 1992—just five years after the guidelines went into effect—put it
118
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this way: “Judges say the guidelines fail to achieve fairness, often are too confusing
and undermine the fairness of criminal trials by taking power from the judge, the
impartial player, and handing it to the prosecutors, who are advocates for the
government.”125 These critiques have continued over the years. In 2016, District
Court Judge John Coughenour, who became a judge before the advent of the
guidelines regime, opined that “the standardization of sentences has resulted in less
justice, not more, and that the way the nation sentences criminals today has created
greater inequality, not less.”126
While federal public defenders and other criminal defense attorneys challenged
the guidelines as unconstitutional from their inception, the guidelines were widely
seen as unassailable, even into the early 2000s. Then the Supreme Court decided
United States v. Booker. The facts of the case were simple: Booker was arrested and
police officers found 92.5 grams of crack cocaine in his duffel bag.127 He later
admitted to selling an additional 566 grams of crack cocaine.128 He went to trial and
the jury found that he was guilty of possessing with intent to distribute at least 50
grams of crack.129 At sentencing, however, the district court judge found by a
preponderance of the evidence that he had distributed more crack than the jury had
found.130 Accordingly, the judge increased Booker’s base offense under the
guidelines and sentenced him to thirty years.131
Booker appealed, arguing that his sentence violated the Sixth Amendment. The
Supreme Court ultimately issued two holdings: (1) the constitutional holding—that
the guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment because they allowed judges to find
facts that increased the defendant’s punishment above the statutory maximum by a
preponderance of the evidence rather than the jury making those findings beyond a
reasonable doubt; and (2) the remedial holding—that the constitutional infirmity
could be remedied by making the guidelines advisory, as opposed to mandatory.132
In Kimbrough v. United States, the Supreme Court extended judicial discretion
still further, holding that district court judges could vary from the guidelines based
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on a policy disagreement.133 Kimbrough is in many ways a surprising case, both
because of its procedural history and its holding. There was no circuit split—instead,
the appellate courts had uniformly held that judges could not disagree with the
crack/powder cocaine guidelines on policy grounds. The Supreme Court accepted
the case nonetheless and ultimately granted sentencing judges more power.134
The district court judge in Kimbrough had concluded that the 100-to-1
crack/powder disparity led to a sentencing range that was much greater than
necessary to accomplish § 3553(a)’s objectives.135 He contrasted Kimbrough’s
guidelines range of 228 to 270 months (19 to 22 years) with the drastically lower 97
to 106 month range (8 to 9 years) that Kimbrough would have faced if the drug were
powder cocaine, rather than crack cocaine.136 He found this difference
“unbelievable” and “clearly inappropriate.”137 Accordingly, the judge varied below
the applicable guideline range, although he could not reduce Kimbrough’s sentence
below the 15-year mandatory minimum, which he also believed was “too long.”138
The government appealed the sentence and, in a per curiam opinion, the Fourth
Circuit vacated the sentence as unreasonable.139
The Supreme Court began its opinion by laying out the history of the
crack/powder disparity, starting with the 1986 Act’s focus on drug quantity to set
mandatory minimum sentences.140 As the Court explained, the 100-to-1 ratio was
created because “Congress apparently believed that crack was significantly more
dangerous than powder cocaine.”141 But in reaching this conclusion, Congress relied
on “assumptions,” not evidence.142 In lockstep response, the Commission developed
guidelines that simply adopted Congress’ weight-driven scheme without basing the
drug guidelines “on data about past sentencing practices” as it was supposed to do.143
Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded that the Commission “did not use [its]
empirical approach in developing the Guidelines sentences for drug-trafficking
133
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offenses.”144 This failure on the Commission’s part diminished the reliability of the
resulting guidelines, which in turn increased judges’ authority to deviate from them.
Because the drug guidelines did not “exemplify the Commission’s exercise of its
characteristic institutional role,” judges were permitted to vary from them, even in a
“mine-run” case.145
The Supreme Court sent an important message in Kimbrough: Congress’ failure
to enact evidence-based reform authorized district court judges to ignore the
crack/powder disparity and to make discretionary sentencing decisions in individual
cases. The Court exhaustively detailed Congress’ intransigence in the face of the
Commission’s decades-long efforts to eliminate or reduce the disparity. In 1995, the
Commission recommended a 1:1 ratio to Congress, but Congress rejected it.146 The
Commission continued to urge Congress to reduce the disparity in the years that
followed.147 In a 2002 report to Congress, the Commission explained why the
disparity was so problematic, and emphasized that the disparity “fails to meet the
sentencing objectives set forth by Congress in both the Sentencing Reform Act and
the 1986 Act.”148 Finally, in 2007, the Commission took action on its own, reducing
the base offense level for crack cocaine by two levels, while acknowledging that a
“comprehensive solution” required Congressional action.149
Although Kimbrough clearly expanded judicial sentencing discretion, it left
important questions unanswered. One was whether judges could vary from the
guidelines based on a “policy disagreement with them, and not simply based on an
individualized determination that they yield an excessive sentence in a particular
case.”150 In Spears v. United States, the Supreme Court answered this question in the
affirmative, confirming that individual judges could substitute their own ratio to
correct the crack/powder disparity.151
Another post-Kimbrough question was whether a judge could disagree on
policy grounds with a guideline that was the product of a congressional directive,
such as the career offender guideline or fast-track guideline. Most circuits
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determined that sentencing judges had the discretion to do so.152 But in the career
offender context, the Eleventh Circuit and the Seventh Circuit disagreed. The
Eleventh Circuit reasoned that the Supreme Court had drawn an explicit distinction
between the way the guidelines treated crack and powder cocaine—which Congress
did not direct—and the guidelines’ harsh punishment of career offenders—which
Congress expressly directed.153 The Seventh Circuit agreed in United States v.
Welton.154 On petition for a writ of certiorari, the Solicitor General confessed error,
concluding that the Eleventh Circuit’s holding was inconsistent with Booker and
Kimbrough.155 The Solicitor General recommended that the court grant the petition,
vacate the Eleventh Circuit’s judgment, and remand for further proceedings, which
the Supreme Court did. Accordingly, it is now settled law that district judges can
categorically disagree on policy grounds with the career offender guideline—or any
other guideline that is the product of a congressional directive.
III. EFFORTS TO REFORM FEDERAL DRUG LAWS
A. The Problem of High Pretrial Detention Rates in Drug Cases
Just as the drug statutes and guidelines have contributed to high sentences at
the back end, the BRA’s provisions that favor detention in drug cases have driven
high federal pretrial detention rates at the front end.156 In 2017, the Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts published the first study to examine the effect of the
presumptions of detention on pretrial detention rates since the BRA’s passage.157
That AO study found that, from 1995 to 2010, the percentage of people charged with
drug offenses who were detained pretrial increased from 76% to 84%.158 Moreover,
the AO study shows that the presumption of detention has become “an almost de
152

See Tom McKay, Judicial Discretion to Consider Sentencing Disparities Created by FastTrack Programs: Resolving the Post-Kimbrough Circuit Split, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1423, 1445 (2011)
(outlining the career offender circuit split); Alison Siegler, Disparities and Discretion in Fast-Track
Sentencing, 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 299, 300 (2009) (describing the fast-track circuit split).
153

United States v. Vazquez, 558 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 2009).

154

583 F.3d 494, 499 (7th Cir. 2009).

155

See Brief for the United States at 10, Vazquez v. United States, 558 U.S. 1144 (2010) (No.

09-5370).
156
See Austin, supra note 17, at 52 (“Since 1984, the pretrial detention rate for federal
defendants has been steadily increasing. Recent work has aimed to address why the detention rate
continues to rise and if there may be alternatives that could slow or reverse this trend. The presumption
for detention statute, which assumes that defendants charged with certain offenses should be detained,
has been identified as one potential factor contributing to the rising detention rate.”); see also Siegler
Written Statement, supra note 15, at 13, 16.
157

See Austin, supra note 17, at 53.
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facto detention order in almost half of all federal cases” and “has contributed to a
massive increase in the federal pretrial detention rate, with all of the social and
economic costs associated with high rates of incarceration.”159
This is far from what the BRA intended. Congress enacted the presumption of
detention to “detain high-risk defendants who were likely to pose a significant risk
of danger to the community”160 and “major drug traffickers” who were likely to flee
if released.161 The AO study found that the presumption has strayed from “its
intended purpose” of “detaining high-risk” individuals who are “likely to pose a
significant danger to the community,” and instead over-incarcerates low-risk
defendants.162 For example, when a low-risk individual is not facing a presumption
of detention, they are released 94% of the time.163 Yet an identically low-risk
individual in a presumption case is released just 68% of the time.164 All in all, the
drug presumption is a “poorly defined attempt to identify high-risk defendants based
primarily on their charge.”165
The AO study led the Judicial Conference to ask Congress to eliminate the
presumption in most drug cases because it was “unnecessarily increasing detention
rates of low-risk defendants.”166 Specifically, the Judicial Conference recommended
that Congress limit the drug presumption to people with very serious criminal
records.167 In reiterating this recommendation in 2020, the Judicial Conference
explained: “This provision reduces unnecessary pretrial detention of certain low-risk
defendants charged with drug trafficking offenses by limiting the application of the
presumption of detention to defendants whose criminal history suggests that they
pose a higher risk of failing to appear . . . or that they may be a danger to the
community.”168 This recommendation implies that the federal judiciary’s policymaking body does not believe that all individuals subject to the presumption
automatically pose a danger to the community. Yet Congress has taken no action on
159

Id. at 61.

160

Id. at 56–57.

161

See supra Part I (discussing the legislative history of the drug presumption).

162
See Austin, supra note 17, at 56–57; see also Matthew G. Rowland, The Rising Federal
Pretrial Detention Rate in Context, 82 FED. PROBATION 13, 18 (2018).
163

Siegler Written Statement, supra note 15, at 14 (citing Austin, supra note 17, at 57).
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Id.

165

Austin, supra note 17, at 60.

166

JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 7, at 10.

167

See id. (recommending that the presumption apply only to people who “have previously been
convicted of two or more offenses described in subsection [3142](f)(1),” which are limited to drug,
gun, terrorism, minor victim, and certain violent offenses).
168

See 2020 Judicial Conference Letter, supra note 8, at Enclosure 2 at 2.
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either recommendation, and the drug presumption of detention continues to apply to
most federal drug cases around the country.
As the Judicial Conference has recognized, high detention rates come with
significant costs.169 While one of the BRA’s rationales for pretrial detention is the
protection of the community, evidence shows that detention is more likely to
increase crime than prevent it. A 2017 study found that although pretrial detention
reduces a person’s criminal activity in the short term, “by eighteen months posthearing, detention is associated with a 30% increase in new felony charges and a
20% increase in new misdemeanor charges,” which is consistent with other research
that “even short-term detention has criminogenic effects.”170 Moreover, data shows
that pretrial detention—even for a few days—is correlated with higher rates of
recidivism.171 This finding is especially concerning as people are spending a longer
time in jail awaiting trial.172
Evidence from the state and federal systems demonstrates that pretrial detention
hurts people and communities in other ways as well. People who are detained are
more likely to “lose their jobs, their homes, their health, and even their children”
than those who are released.173 On the job front, a recent study found that people
who were released on bail had much better employment outcomes in the formal
employment market.174 People who are detained are less likely to find a job or have
any income, and have lower incomes if they are employed.175 Pretrial detention also
contributes to housing instability and homelessness. A Federal Probation study
found that of those detained less than three days, 29.9% reported that their housing
situation became less stable; the number rose to 37.2% for those detained more than
three days.176
169

See id.

170
Paul Heaton et al., The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69
STAN. L. REV. 711, 718 (2017); see also Arpit Gupta, et al., The Heavy Costs of High Bail: Evidence
from Judge Randomization, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 471 (2016).
171

See CHRISTOPHER L. LOWENKAMP ET AL., THE HIDDEN COSTS OF PRETRIAL DETENTION, THE
ARNOLD FOUNDATION 19 (2013). In the study, people who were detained were 1.3 times more likely to
recidivate compared to people released on bail at some point before trial. Id.
172
Austin, supra note 17, at 53–54 (“As of 2016, the average period of pretrial detention for a
pretrial defendant had reached 255 days, although several districts average over 400 days in pretrial
detention.”).
173

Alison Siegler & Erica Zunkel, Rethinking Federal Bail Advocacy to Change the Culture of
Detention, THE CHAMPION, at 5 (July 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3601230 [hereinafter Rethinking
Federal Bail Advocacy].
174
See Will Dobbie et al., The Effects of Pretrial Detention on Conviction, Future Crime, and
Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges, 108 AM. ECON. REV. 201, 227 (2018).
175
176

See id.

Alexander M. Holsinger & Kristi Holsinger, Analyzing Bond Supervision Survey Data: The
Effects of Pretrial Detention on Self-Reported Outcomes, 82 FED. PROBATION 39, 42 (2018).
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Finally, pretrial detention contributes to worse case outcomes. A detained
person may feel pressure to “plead guilty to get out of jail, or accept an overly
punitive plea deal because detention impaired her ability to gather evidence or meet
with her lawyer. She may be less motivated to fight the charges when the fixed costs
of incarceration have already been paid: stigma, loss of employment, housing or
child care, etc.”177 Research also shows that in the federal system, pretrial detention
“significantly increases sentences, decreases the probability that a defendant will
receive a below-Guidelines sentence, and decreases the probability that they will
avoid a mandatory minimum if facing one.”178
These sweeping collateral consequences are particularly problematic in light of
data that people in the federal system are extremely unlikely to commit new crimes
on bond or fail to appear in court.179 As we have highlighted elsewhere, over 98%
of people released in federal cases do not commit new crimes on release, and 99%
appear for court.180 This data proves that “when release increases, crime and flight
do not,”181 strongly suggesting that judges should do as we propose and safely
release more people on bail.
B. Federal Drug Laws
Federal judges are particularly well situated to drive drug law reform because
they have long been vocal about the problems with federal drug laws, in particular
mandatory minimums and statutory recidivist enhancements. It is hard to think of a
topic about which federal judges have been more outspoken—from Supreme Court
justices to district court judges. In calling on federal judges to speak out against mass
incarceration, Judge Jed Rakoff observed: “On one issue—opposition to mandatory
minimum laws—the federal judiciary has been consistent in its opposition and clear
in its message.”182 In 2016, Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer went before the
House of Representatives’ Appropriations Subcommittee and lambasted mandatory
minimums: “You want mandatory minimums? I’ve said publicly many times that I
177
Megan Stevenson, Distortion of Justice: How the Inability to Pay Bail Affects Case
Outcomes, J.L. ECON. & ORG. 511, 512 (2018) (finding that pretrial detention leads to a 13% increase
“in the likelihood of being convicted on at least one charge.”).
178

Stephanie Holmes Didwania, The Immediate Consequences of Pretrial Detention, 30 AM. L.
ECON. REV. (forthcoming 2020); see also Austin, supra note 17, at 53–54 (citing studies that show
worse case outcomes when people are detained pretrial).
179

See Siegler Written Statement, supra note 15, at 4.

180

See Siegler & Zunkel, Rethinking Federal Bail Advocacy, supra note 173, at 3
(demonstrating that “this near-perfect compliance rate is seen equally in federal districts with very high
release rates and those with very low release rates”); ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS., Judicial Business: Federal
Pretrial Services Tables, Table H-15 (2019), https://perma.cc/LYG4-AX4H.
181

Siegler & Zunkel, Rethinking Federal Bail Advocacy, supra note 173, at 3–4.

182

Rakoff, supra note 29.
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think they’re a terrible idea.”183 Retired Justice Anthony Kennedy told the American
Bar Association in 2003: “I can accept neither the necessity nor the wisdom of
federal mandatory minimums. In too many cases, mandatory minimum sentences
are unwise and unjust.”184
Federal judges have assailed drug mandatory minimums in a variety of ways.
Mandatory minimums “distort the sentencing process and mandate unjust
sentences.”185 They discourage people from exercising their constitutional right to
trial.186 They were created to punish high-level drug traffickers, but often do not.187
The most culpable receive more lenient sentences because they can provide
“substantial assistance” to the government, while the least culpable have little, if
any, information of value.188 They disparately impact people of color.189 They take
sentencing discretion from judges and give it to prosecutors.190 These critiques have
come from judges with wide-ranging judicial philosophies. For example, in United
States v. Brigham, Seventh Circuit Judge Frank Easterbrook acknowledged the
“troubling” nature of drug mandatory minimums that punish the least culpable most
severely because “it accords with no one’s theory of appropriate punishments.”191

183

Justices Anthony Kennedy & Stephen Breyer, Supreme Court Fiscal Year 2016 Budget (CSPAN User Created Clip Mar. 23, 2015), https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4532246/user-clip-justiceskennedy-breyer-criminal-justice.
184
Justice Anthony Kennedy, Speech at the American Bar Association Annual Meeting: An
Address by Anthony M. Kennedy (Aug. 9, 2003), https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo
/speeches/sp_08-09-03.html.
185

United States v. Dossie, 851 F. Supp. 2d 478, 478 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).

186
United States v. Bowen, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50670 (E.D. La. 2012) (“The problem with
mandatory minimums is that they have a coercive effect . . . . This extraordinary pressure can result in
false cooperation and guilty pleas by innocent people.”).
187

See, e.g., United States v. Leitch, 2013 WL 753445, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[M]any lowlevel drug trafficking defendants are receiving the harsh mandatory minimums that Congress explicitly
created only for leaders and managers of drug operations.”).
188

See, e.g., Dossie, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 487.

189

See, e.g., United States v. Clary, 846 F. Supp. 768, 772, 792 (E.D. Miss. 1994) (“[T]he ‘100
to 1’ ratio, coupled with mandatory minimum sentencing provided by federal statute has created a
situation that reeks with inhumanity and injustice. . . . [I]f young white males were being incarcerated
at the same rate as young black males, the statute would have been amended long ago.”).
190
See, e.g., Dossie, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 485 (“The government simply dictated a five-year
sentence without even having to allege, let alone prove, the aggravating fact that it implied warranted
the sentence.”).
191
977 F.2d 317, 318 (7th Cir. 1992); see also Opinion: Justice Kennedy Speaks Out, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 12, 2003), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/12/opinion/justice-kennedy-speaksout.html (“Justice Kennedy said he could accept neither their ‘necessity’ nor their ‘wisdom.’ He is
hardly alone, even among conservative[] [judges], in raising these objections.”).
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In 2010, federal judges were surveyed about their views on drug mandatory
minimum sentences and the results were overwhelmingly negative. Seventy-six
percent responded that the crack cocaine mandatory minimum was too high; 54%
responded that the marijuana mandatory minimum was too high; and approximately
44% responded that the heroin, drug, and powder cocaine mandatory minimums
were too high.192 By contrast, a majority of them responded that the mandatory
minimums for firearms and child pornography production and distribution offenses
were “appropriate.”193
The Judicial Conference of the United States has long opposed mandatory
minimums and supported legislative reform.194 In a 2013 letter to Congress, the
Judicial Conference’s Criminal Law Committee stated: “For 60 years, the Judicial
Conference has consistently and vigorously opposed mandatory minimum
sentences” because they waste taxpayer dollars, produce “disproportionately severe
sentences,” and “undermine confidence in the judicial system.”195 The letter
highlighted drug mandatory minimums in particular as unfair because “the only
considerations” are the type and amount of drugs.196
Federal judges have also criticized recidivist drug enhancements that until 2018
could increase mandatory minimums up to life imprisonment. (The FSA reduced
and narrowed these recidivist enhancements, but left them on the books.) Retired
District Court Judge John Gleeson observed that recidivist enhancements “coerce[]
guilty pleas and produce[] sentences so excessively severe they take your breath
away.”197 First Circuit Judge Gilbert Merritt condemned a prosecutor’s decision to
double the 10-year mandatory minimum to 20 years in the case of a mentally-ill man
whose offense was nonviolent, saying it “passe[d] all understanding.”198 Judge
Merritt also highlighted Congress’ dysfunction on the drug law reform front in the
face of sustained criticism: “[t]he Judicial Conference of the United States for almost
20 years, and the Sentencing Commission for almost 10 years, have pleaded with
192

U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, RESULTS OF SURVEY OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES
JANUARY 2010 THROUGH MARCH 2010 (June 2010), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/
research-and-publications/research-projects-and-surveys/surveys/20100608_Judge_Survey.pdf.
193

Id.
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See, e.g., Letter from Honorable Robert Holmes Bell to Senator Patrick J. Leahy, at 1 (Sept.
17, 2013), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/judge-bell-chairman-leahy-mandatory-minim
ums.pdf.
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Id. at 1–2, 4.
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Id. at 5.
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United States v. Kupa, 976 F. Supp. 2d 417, 420, 459 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (“The prior felony
[§ 851] information ushered that 800-pound gorilla into the case at the eleventh hour and it took the
case over. Once it was filed, everything that followed was done with all eyes on the draconian sentence
that a jury’s verdict of guilty would require me to impose.”).
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United States v. Gonzalez-Ramirez, 561 F.3d 22, 31 (1st Cir. 2009) (Merritt, J., concurring).
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the judiciary committees of Congress to do something about the serious injustices
that these long mandatory minimum sentences impose—to no avail.”199
Beyond the federal judiciary, there is widespread agreement that federal
mandatory minimum drug laws are inhumane, waste taxpayer money, and deprive
judges of sentencing discretion. In a study done for the Pew Charitable Trusts, voters
were asked their views about people who violate drug laws. Told that a large
percentage of the people in federal prison are incarcerated for drug offenses, sixtyone percent said, “[t]hat is too many drug criminals taking up too much space in our
federal prison system. More of that space should be used for people who have
committed acts of violence or terrorism.”200 The same study found that eight in ten
voters support giving judges the flexibility to determine drug sentences based on the
individualized facts of a case.201
Despite the judiciary’s vocal opposition and public censure, Congress has not
meaningfully reformed mandatory minimum drug laws since they were enacted
nearly thirty years ago.202 The FSA tinkers around the edges of reform, but does not
alter the 1986 Act’s original sin of pegging drug sentences to drug type and quantity,
nor does it eliminate drug mandatory minimums.203 On the positive side, the FSA
reduces and narrows harsh mandatory minimum recidivist enhancements,204
expands the safety valve so that more people are eligible to receive a sentence below
the mandatory minimum if they meet certain (still stringent) requirements,205 and
makes the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 retroactive.
199

Id.

200

Mellman Group & Public Opinion Strategies, National Survey Key Findings—Federal
Sentencing & Prisons, Pew Trusts, 1 (Feb. 10, 2016).
201

Id.

202
While it is beyond the scope of this article, the Department of Justice remains a consistent
roadblock to drug law reform. See generally Rachel E. Barkow & Marc Osler, Designed to Fail: The
President’s Deference to the Department of Justice in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 59 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 387, 418, 421 (2017) (describing the Department of Justice’s “institutional biases in
favor of the statute quo and avoiding any risk that someone released early might commit a dangerous
offense” and its resistance to mandatory minimum reform because such penalties provide leverage to
secure pleas and cooperation).
203

First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 756, 132 Stat. 5194, 5202 (2018).

204
The FSA made two changes. First, it changed the length of the enhancement. Previously, 21
U.S.C. §§ 841 and 960 permitted prosecutors to seek a 20-year mandatory minimum if the person had
one prior conviction for a “felony drug offense” (including simple possession) and a mandatory
minimum of life if the person had two of those convictions, no matter how old. The new mandatory
minimums are reduced to 15 years and 25 years respectively. Second, the FSA changed the definition
of what type of offense qualifies for an increased mandatory minimum sentence. Now, only prior
convictions for a “serious drug felony” or a “serious violent felony” count. See First Step Act of 2018,
Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 756, 132 Stat. 5194, 5202 (2018).
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Prosecutors have an important say in who receives safety valve relief. The guidelines provide
that a person must “truthfully provide[] to the Government all information and evidence the defendant
has concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the same course of conduct or of a common
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Certainly, the FSA has ameliorated problems at the margins and is better than
nothing. Moreover, reformers have talked earnestly about the FSA being just that—
a “first step”—with plans to push additional reform.206 Yet, the politics of federal
criminal justice reform remain complicated. Senator Tom Cotton (R-AK) was a
vocal critic of the First Step Act and nearly succeeded in defeating the bill. While
lobbying against it, he called for increasing drug sentences.207 Senator Cotton also
slammed prior iterations of federal criminal reform, calling them “criminal
leniency” bills.208 He is sure to be a critic of any future bills. Senator John Kennedy
(R-LA) issued a statement explaining why he opposed the FSA: “[T]he most
important goal of the criminal justice system for American families is justice. This
bill is backwards. It favors criminals over victims. It forgets that the ultimate goal is
justice. We’ve seen what’s happened with so-called criminal justice reform in
Louisiana. People are literally getting killed.”209 Even conservatives condemned
Senator Kennedy’s opposition to the FSA as “all wrong.”210
Senator Cotton and Senator Kennedy’s comments are not surprising. National
politicians traditionally have benefitted from being tough on crime and stoking fears
about easing criminal laws, no matter how misguided those laws are.211 Senator Ted
Cruz (R-TX) is a recent example. In 2015, he “criticized ‘draconian mandatory
minimum sentences’ and bragged about supporting [the] bill that would cut them in

scheme or plan.” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5C1.2(a)(5) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2018). The safety valve guideline squarely permits a prosecutor to withhold a recommendation for
relief—and, as a result, a sentence below the mandatory minimum—if she determines that the person
has not been truthful. See id.; see also United States v. Montes, 381 F.3d 631, 634 (7th Cir. 2004)
(discussing the truthful disclosure prong).
206
Ames Grawert & Tim Lau, How the First Step Act Became Law–And What Happens Next,
BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE (Jan. 4, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysisopinion/how-first-step-act-became-law-and-what-happens-next.
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Help, USA TODAY (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2018/11/15/tom-cottoncongresss-criminal-justice-reform-bill-opioids-laws-column/2003829002/.
208
Nick Gass, Sen. Tom Cotton: U.S. Has ‘Under-Incarceration Problem,’ POLITICO (May 19,
2016), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/05/tom-cotton-under-incarceration-223371.
209
Press Release, Sen. John Kennedy (R-La.) Stands Against So-called Criminal Justice
Legislation (Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.kennedy.senate.gov/public/press-releases?ID=53A5A24BF362-4E78-978A-191F7C172F64.
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Derek Cohen, Opinion: Tucker Carlson and John Kennedy Get the First Step All Wrong,
WASH. EXAMINER (July 24, 2019), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/tucker-carlson-andjohn-kennedy-get-the-first-step-act-all-wrong.
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half for federal drug offenders.”212 His tune changed considerably after he launched
his 2016 presidential bid. He became one of most vocal critics of the Sentencing
Reform and Corrections Act, which was a precursor bill to the FSA.213 This type of
politics is not just the province of Republicans. “Everybody in politics exploits race
and crime, Democrats as much as Republicans, including, of course, Bill Clinton—
who took time off his campaign for president to go back to Arkansas to preside over
the execution of a mentally defective black prisoner.”214
The year 2020 may hold promise for criminal reform more generally. In the
wake of George Floyd’s death and nationwide protests calling for systemic change,
federal politicians have introduced bills to reform policing215 and a bipartisan bill
that makes modest reforms to releasing elderly and sick people from prison.216 They
would be wise to focus on drug law reform. The continued use of federal mandatory
minimum drug laws diminishes respect for the system and its players, including law
enforcement.217
IV. THE PATH FORWARD: A MORE VOCAL JUDICIARY
As of 2020, the federal criminal law reform landscape remains challenging, and
the system continues to single out drug offenses for harsh treatment at the bail and
sentencing stages.
212

Jacob Sullum, Ted Cruz Abandons Criminal Justice Reform on His Way to the White House,
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Samuel G. Gross, Crime, Politics, and Race, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 405, 412 (1997).
See also ALEXANDER, supra note 88, at 56 (“[I]n 1992, presidential candidate Bill Clinton vowed that
he would never permit any Republican to be perceived as tougher on crime than he.”).
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See Sandeep Dhaliwal, How Mandatory Minimums are Weaponized, N.Y. TIMES (July 1,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/01/opinion/mandatory-minimum-sentences-protest.html
(“Reforms to eliminate mandatory minimums and rein in prosecutorial overreaching are vital to
comprehensively reforming our overly punitive criminal justice systems, whose harshness
disproportionately affects communities of color.”); Scott Hechinger, How Mandatory Minimums
Enable Police Misconduct, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/25/
opinion/mandatory-minimum-sentencing.html (mandatory minimums “insulate police misconduct”);
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At the front end, federal bail reform efforts in Congress have been virtually
non-existent. Federal legislators have pushed for states to reform their bail systems
while ignoring the federal pretrial detention crisis at their doorstep.218 For example,
in 2017, Senators Kamala Harris (D-CA) and Rand Paul (R-KY) introduced the
Pretrial Integrity and Safety Act to encourage states “to reform or replace the bail
system.”219 In an op-ed supporting their legislation, Harris and Paul highlighted the
importance of bail reform, but did not once mention the high federal pretrial
detention rate or possible reforms, such as eliminating or narrowing the drug
presumption as the Judicial Conference has recommended.220 Likewise, Senator
Bernie Sanders (I-VT) introduced the No Money Bail Act in 2018 to end money bail
in the federal system. However, this bill would have had little impact because federal
law already specifically prohibits a judge from imposing a financial condition that
results in pretrial jailing.221 In a heartening development, the House Judiciary
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security held a hearing on
federal and state bail reform last fall.222 Representative Jerrold Nadler (D-NY)
highlighted the rising federal pretrial detention rate and commented that “surely
community safety does not justify this trend.”223 What this hearing portends for
future reform is an open question.
At the back end, there is a real danger that momentum for the “second step” of
federal drug law reform will stall and there will be no political will to revisit federal
mandatory minimums for decades into the future. As President Trump said during a
2020 Super Bowl ad, “I got it done, and the people in this room got it done,”224
suggesting that there is no work left to do. Of course, defense attorneys and
reformers should continue to make arguments against mandatory minimums in drug
cases, and most certainly will. But they cannot make those arguments alone.
To fill the void left by Congress’ inaction, judges should use their discretion at
the bail and sentencing stages of a drug case to effectuate reform and reduce mass
218
See Siegler Written Statement, supra note 15, at 1 (“The federal pretrial detention system is
in crisis, too, but its problems have been largely overlooked, even by federal legislators.”).
219
Kamala Harris & Rand Paul, To Shrink Jails, Let’s Reform Bail, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2017),
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Cong. (Nov. 14, 2019) [hereinafter House Bail Hearing], https://judiciary.house.gov/calendar/
eventsingle.aspx?EventID=2256.
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incarceration. At the front end, they should make evidence-based decisions that
account for the fiscal and human costs of pretrial detention and use their considerable
discretion to release more people on bond. This includes closely scrutinizing any
government request for temporary pretrial detention at the initial appearance hearing
and giving little weight to the presumption of detention at the detention hearing. On
the back end, judges should lodge categorical policy disagreements with the drug
sentencing guideline and the career offender sentencing guideline using
Kimbrough’s blueprint. At both stages, judges should issue written opinions that
highlight the evidence supporting reform.
A. Advancing Bail Reform by Encouraging the Release of More People on Bond
Judges should work to counteract the BRA’s over-detention of people charged
with drug offenses without waiting for Congress to change the law. As discussed in
Part I, the BRA permits prosecutors to request temporary detention at the initial
appearance hearing if the person is charged with a drug offense that has a maximum
term of imprisonment of ten years or more.225 The BRA also mandates a presumption
of detention in those cases.226 As discussed in Part II, supra, the legislative history
of the drug presumption shows that legislators intended it to apply to “major drug
traffickers” with the financial means to flee. Senator Chiles, one of the strongest
proponents of the drug presumption, conceded that “[o]ften a person who has been
arrested for drug dealing may not be dangerous in the sense that he is likely to rob
or kill someone.”227 Data shows that the presumption is not working as legislators
intended, and the Judicial Conference has recommended that Congress eliminate it
in most cases. It is unclear when Congress will take action, if ever.
To counteract Congress’ dysfunction and promote reform, judges should
release more people charged with drug offenses. The pretrial detention rates are
simply too high. They do not reflect what legislators intended and they do not
promote the BRA’s goals. The BRA gives judges ample discretion to make release
decisions, even when a person is subject to the presumption. To effectuate higher
release rates in drug cases, judges should take two important steps.
First, at the initial appearance stage, judges should closely scrutinize
prosecutors’ requests for temporary detention in drug cases. The BRA does not
require temporary detention in drug cases; it is only triggered “upon motion of the
attorney for the Government.”228 The data on rising pretrial detention rates strongly
suggest that prosecutors are moving for detention in too many cases. Since 2006,
federal prosecutors’ national detention request rates have ranged from 60% to
225

See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(C).

226
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65%.229 Prosecutors consistently request detention at higher rates than Pretrial
Services.230 During that same time period, judges responded by detaining more
people, and by 2018 their detention rates were within two percentage points of the
prosecutors’ request rates (61% and 63%, respectively).231 In 2019, judges’
detention rates finally leveled off at 61% even as prosecutors’ request rates spiked
to 65%, their highest point in the public data.232 Rather than being swayed by
prosecutors’ harsh approach to bond, judges should follow the evidence-based
approach suggested in this paper.
Just because prosecutors can move for detention does not mean they should. If
prosecutors make a motion for temporary detention, judges should ask them to
explain why they are moving for temporary detention, particularly if available
information suggests that the person poses a low risk of flight or danger. Especially
when the person played a small role in the overall drug operation or has little to no
criminal history, a judge should propose release conditions that they believe would
reasonably assure the person’s safety and appearance, and should ask the prosecutor
to consider withdrawing their detention request. If the prosecutor persists in seeking
detention the judge is required to detain the person temporarily, but the judge can
still remind the prosecutor that temporary detention in a drug case is a discretionary
call by the prosecutor. The judge can also emphasize that, under the BRA, release is
the norm and detention is the “carefully-limited exception.”233
Second, at the detention hearing stage, judges should give the drug presumption
little weight in the overall detention analysis. Judges can explain that the drug
presumption is not working as legislators intended by citing the legislative history
discussed in Part I, supra, and the AO study discussed in Part III, supra. The
legislative history shows that Congress intended the drug presumption to apply to
kingpin traffickers, not virtually every person charged with a federal drug offense.
Furthermore, legislators intended the presumption to apply to people who were
229
ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS., Judicial Business: Federal Pretrial Services Tables, Table H-3A
(Sept. 30, 2006–Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.uscourts.gov/data-table-numbers/h-3a.
230
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(showing nationwide judicial detention rate of 61% in 2018); ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS., Judicial Business:
Federal Pretrial Services Tables, Table H-3A (Sept. 30, 18), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/
default/files/data_tables/jb_h3a_0930.2018.pdf (showing nationwide AUSA detention request rate of
63% in 2018).
232
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(showing nationwide judicial detention rate of 61% in 2019); ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS., Judicial Business:
Federal Pretrial Services Tables, Table H-3A (Sept. 30, 19), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/
files/data_tables/jb_h3a_0930.2019.pdf (showing nationwide AUSA detention request rate of 65% in
2019).
233

Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755.

316

OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW

Vol: 18.1:283

highly likely to flee. But the AO study shows that the presumption does not correlate
with dangerousness or flight risk.234 Instead, the presumption over-detains the
lowest-risk offenders in the system and has “a negligible effect on the highest-risk
defendants.”235 The AO study is a gold mine for judges who want an evidence-based
reason to detain fewer people in presumption cases. After all, the federal judiciary’s
own policy-making body has repeatedly relied on the study to conclude that the
presumption sweeps far too broadly and should apply only to drug offenders with
serious priors.236 Despite the strength of the study and recommendation, only one
federal judge has ever cited the AO study in a written opinion237 and no judge has
cited the Judicial Conference’s recommendation. That should also change.
Judicial action is especially important in light of the COVID-19 pandemic that
is ravaging federal jails and prisons.238 While Attorney General William J. Barr has
recommended releasing people from federal prisons to home confinement, “he has
directed his federal prosecutors . . . to largely oppose releasing people from federal
jails,” purportedly to advance community safety.239 But, as we have argued
elsewhere, COVID-19 changes “the safety-of-the-community calculus,”240
especially in light of data showing that people released on bond do not commit new
234

Austin, supra note 17, at 62 (“[T]he presumption has failed to correctly identify defendants
who are most likely to be rearrested for any offense, rearrested for a violent offense, fail to appear, or
be revoked for technical violations.”).
235

Austin, supra note 17, at 57, 60; Siegler Written Statement, supra note 15, at 14.
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crimes or fail to appear in court.241 Judges should use their discretion to release more
people on bond during the COVID-19 pandemic to protect people charged with
crimes and their communities.242
B. Advancing Reform by Lodging Policy Disagreements with the Drug Sentencing
Guidelines and the Career Offender Guideline
Judges should also advance reform at the sentencing stage by lodging policy
disagreements with the drug guidelines and the career offender guideline and
varying from them, even in “mine-run” cases. Judges should articulate their policy
disagreements in written opinions. “The published judicial opinion is the ‘heart of
the common law system,’” and is “critical to what we understand to be the ‘law.’”243
Moreover, judges “ensure the legitimacy of their decisions by preparing and
publishing opinions that explain and justify their reasoning.”244 By issuing written
opinions that disagree with the guidelines in drug cases, judges “reform sentencing
on their own”245 and develop sentencing common law until Congress changes the
laws.
Kimbrough “generated a tsunami to the ongoing sea change in federal
sentencing” because, for the first time, the Supreme Court authorized judges to vary
from the drug guidelines, even without a showing that the person’s individual case
was mitigated or extraordinary.246 In so doing, the Court put down a post-Booker
mutiny by seven federal courts of appeals.247 In Spears, the Supreme Court had to
step in once again to affirm that it meant what it said in Kimbrough: “That was
indeed the point of Kimbrough: a recognition of district courts’ authority to vary
from the crack cocaine Guidelines based on policy disagreement with them, and not
simply based on an individualized determination that they yield an excessive
sentence in a particular case.”248
Since Kimbrough, however, only a small number of judges “invok[e] . . . policy
disagreements with the guidelines and policy statements to help ameliorate the
241
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harshness of the guidelines in general, especially in drug cases.”249 That is troubling
in light of Kimbrough and Spears’ clear holding that judges have the discretion to
disagree with the guidelines on policy grounds, even if it creates “variations between
district courts.”250 Former federal district court judge Mark Bennett has posited
many reasons why judges are reluctant to question the guidelines: fear of reversal,
concerns about sentencing uniformity, the guidelines’ “strong cognitive anchoring
effect,” and a consequence of judges giving the Commission “far too much credit”
for creating guidelines based on empirical research and prior national experience.251
Right after Kimbrough, two appellate judges warned that issuing policy
disagreements with the guidelines would have disastrous results. Judge Michael
Fisher urged judges not to use their discretion under Kimbrough to “blaze new
sentencing trails” because it could “result in disparate sentences and, ultimately,
legislative backlash that would strip the federal judiciary of its . . . discretion.”252
Judge Thomas Hardiman concurred: “Congress might impose new, detailed
statutory penalties that will leave district [court] judges with even less discretion
than they possessed in the mandatory Guidelines era.”253 Thankfully, these
doomsday predictions have not come to pass.
Contrary to that perspective, Kimbrough both advanced racial justice and is a
prime example of how the federal judiciary can promote reform through the common
law process.
First, Kimbrough sent a clear message to Congress that the federal judiciary
had concerns about the disparity. People had advocated for decades to eliminate the
crack/powder disparity, which was seen as racially biased from its inception and
perpetuated differential sentencing treatment based on race.254 While advocacy
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efforts were of course critical to the Fair Sentencing Act’s passage, Congress
changed the law only after the Supreme Court concluded in Kimbrough that the
disparity was based on erroneous assumptions, not evidence.255 Approximately two
years after Kimbrough, Congress reduced the disparity in the Fair Sentencing Act
and the Commission amended the drug guidelines to reflect the new law.256 During
debate on the Fair Sentencing Act, the House Committee on the Judiciary cited
Kimbrough, noting that the Court had made “a fundamental change in how Federal
judges apply sentencing guidelines regarding cocaine” and that federal judges could
now impose “more reasonable sentences” in crack cases.257
Second, Kimbrough confirmed that federal district court judges had the
discretion to disagree with the disparity, and judges used this discretion to reduce
sentences accordingly. Kimbrough thus provides the federal judiciary with a
blueprint for continued reform of the drug guidelines and the career offender
guideline.
1. Categorical Policy Disagreements with the Drug Sentencing Guidelines
Judges should promote reform by categorically disagreeing with the drug
guidelines in written opinions. As discussed above, the Supreme Court explicitly
approved this approach in Kimbrough and Spears. Moreover, policy disagreements
are “healthy” and promote “the process of constantly improving” the guidelines,
which “were intended to be evolutionary in nature.”258 Policy disagreements are
particularly important when the Commission and Congress are not engaging in
dialogue about sentencing policy, and the Commission simply “‘accept[s] and
incorporate[s]’ the mandatory minimums ‘wholesale into the guideline structure
without the Commission’s independent analysis.’”259 One judge described issuing
policy disagreements with the drug guidelines as an imperative: “Critically
evaluating the crack/cocaine ratio in terms of its fealty to the purposes of the
Sentencing Reform Act is not optional. It is not something that a judge has discretion
to do or not do. The Supreme Court in Kimbrough and Spears held that an advisory
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Guideline system required it.”260 Finally, it is imperative for judges to highlight the
racial disparities that mandatory minimums and the drug guidelines have produced
for the last three decades.261
Kimbrough focused on the problems with the crack cocaine guideline, but the
same arguments apply to other drugs as well. For example, judges have railed against
the drug guidelines’ misguided use of drug type and quantity as a proxy for
culpability. “The structural flaw is easily traced. It is rooted directly in the fateful
choice by the original Commission to link the Guidelines ranges for all drug
trafficking defendants to the onerous mandatory minimum penalties in the AntiDrug Abuse Act of 1986 . . . that were expressly intended for only a few.”262 Former
Judge Bennett points out that “a whopping 83.1% of the meth defendants in federal
court faced a mandatory minimum sentence even though the vast majority were not
kingpins,” because “quantity is a poor proxy for most meth defendants’ criminal
culpability.”263 The drug guidelines also call for increased punishment in
methamphetamine cases based on purity. This distinction is not based on empirical
evidence, careful study, or national experience. “While it may seem logical to punish
a pure substance more than [a] mixed substance, there is no support in the legislative
history to explain the formula underlying greater methamphetamine purity to greater
months of imprisonment.”264 These are all legitimate bases for categorical policy
disagreements with the drug guidelines.
Judges have the discretion to vary from the drug guidelines based on a
categorical policy disagreement, even in a “mine-run” case, and then consider

260
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aggravating and mitigating arguments under § 3553(a).265 Judges who have lodged
categorical policy disagreements with the drug guidelines have fashioned various
remedies for determining what kind of sentencing variance is appropriate. For crack
cocaine, some judges have decided to apply a 1-to-1 ratio in all cases, in spite of
Congress’ adoption of an 18-to-1 ratio.266 For methamphetamine, some judges have
reduced the guidelines by one third “to account for the policy disagreement.”267
Even with judge-crafted remedies and the Commission’s 2014 reduction of the
drug quantity levels across the board, 268 the drug guidelines remains flawed and in
need of reform. As it is, judges vary below the guidelines in drug cases
approximately 33% of the time,269 excluding substantial assistance departures. This
is a clear indication that judges believe that, in at least one third of all federal cases,
the drug guidelines do not properly calibrate sentencing ranges and leads to
sentences that do not fulfill § 3553(a)’s purposes.
2. Categorical Policy Disagreements with the Career Offender Sentencing
Guideline
It is imperative that judges also issue categorical policy disagreements with the
career offender guideline, especially for people with prior records for drugs instead
of violence. The career offender guideline is another byproduct of the War on Drugs.
265
See Hayes, 948 F. Supp. 2d at 1031 (“[A]fter reducing the Guidelines range by one third to
account for the policy disagreement, I will reserve the ability to adjust the figure upwards and
downwards as I weigh the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.”).
266
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Lewis, 623 F. Supp. 2d 42, 45 (D.D.C. 2009).
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It recommends astronomical sentences for people who have been convicted of a drug
trafficking offense and who have two or more drug trafficking offenses on their
record (referred to as “drug trafficking only” career offenders). In 2016, the
Commission recommended that Congress amend the career offender statutory
directive so that it no longer includes those who qualify as career offenders based
solely on drug trafficking offenses.270 In theory, this should be a straightforward
reform because it is supported by ample evidence, but Congress has failed to take
action. Until Congress does, judges should promote reform by disagreeing with the
career offender guideline on policy grounds in “drug trafficking only” career
offender cases. To develop sentencing common law, judges should issue written
opinions that discuss the evidence and explain the problems with applying the career
offender guideline in such cases.
The career offender provision applies to a person who commits a “controlled
substance” offense or a “crime of violence” after two prior felony convictions for
either one of those offenses.271 The guideline has draconian consequences: it
increases all career offenders to Criminal History Category (“CHC”) VI and to
offense levels at or near the statutory maximum penalty of the offense of
conviction.272 The guideline defines a “controlled substance” offense broadly.273
Likewise, career offender predicate convictions bafflingly include misdemeanors
and convictions that result in no jail or prison time.274 As a result, very low-level
offenders who have never before been incarcerated face extremely long sentences if
they fall within the career offender guideline’s net.
The career offender guideline is the Commission’s response to a part of the
SRA that requires sentences for recidivist offenders to be “at or near the maximum
term.”275 Congress was particularly concerned with “repeat drug traffickers,” noting
during debate on the SRA that drug trafficking was an “extremely lucrative”
enterprise “carried on to an unusual degree by persons engaged in continuing
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patterns of criminal activity.”276 As with the BRA and the 1986 Act, Congress was
once again in full War-on-Drugs mode—more focused on being “tough on crime”
than on the practical consequences of requiring the Commission to set sentences for
recidivist drug offenders at or near the statutory maximum.
The Commission made things worse when it formulated the career offender
guideline. It did not “follow the plain terms of this statutory directive” and has since
“expanded the list of qualifying drug offenses by adding numerous state and federal
drug offenses to those listed in § 994(h).”277 Moreover, by pegging the career
offender guideline to the offense’s statutory maximum, the Commission did not
consider whether the resulting sentences satisfied § 3553(a)’s purposes of
punishment or the “parsimony provision.”278 Finally, because most drug offenses
carry a maximum penalty of life imprisonment, people convicted of drug offenses
often face much higher statutory maximum penalties than those who are convicted
of violent offenses.279 For example, nearly 80% of “violent only”280 career offenders
faced statutory maximums of less than 25 years, which bizarrely results in a lower
offense level under the career offender guideline.281
The Commission’s data demonstrate that the career offender guideline is overly
severe, especially in drug cases. Not surprisingly, the career offender provision
impacts people convicted of drug offenses most severely. Of the career offenders
sentenced in Fiscal Year 2018, the overwhelming majority—78%—were convicted
of drug offenses.282 In approximately 93% of these cases, the person’s career
offender status increased their guideline range.283 Nearly 50% of career offenders
saw an increase in both their final offense level and their CHC.284 As the
Commission itself has observed, the career offender provision has “resulted in some
of the most severe penalties imposed under the guidelines,”285 with “the greatest
276
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impact on the offenders in the drug trafficking only category.”286 Because their
sentences are so lengthy, career offenders now account for over 11% of the total
BOP population,287 even though career offender cases only constitute 2.5% of the
federal sentencing docket.288
The career offender guideline also results in disturbing racial disparities. The
Sentencing Commission’s Fifteen Year Report highlighted the career offender
guideline’s “unwarranted adverse impacts” on people of color. 289 In particular, the
Fifteen Year Report found that Black people are more often subject “to the severe
penalties required by the career offender guideline” than similarly-situated White
people because of “the relative ease of detecting and prosecuting offenses that take
place in open-air drug markets, which are most often found in impoverished minority
neighborhoods.”290 That reality puts Black people at a “higher risk of conviction for
a drug trafficking crime,”291 and makes them more likely to have drug convictions
on their record in the first place. The statistics bear this out. In Fiscal Year 2018,
61.6% of career offenders were Black.292 The Commission and the Supreme Court
have recognized the pernicious effect of even the perception of sentencing disparities
based on race, because it fosters “disrespect for and lack of confidence in the
criminal justice system.”293
The foregoing makes clear that judges should issue categorical policy
disagreements with the career offender guideline for “drug trafficking only” career
offenders, regardless of the mitigating or aggravating facts of the case. There are a
number of evidence-based policy reasons judges can give for issuing belowguideline sentences in career offender drug cases.
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First, the career offender guideline is not the product of “careful study,
empirical research, or national experience.”294 Amy Baron-Evans, who was until
recently the Federal Defender’s Chief Sentencing Resource Counsel,
comprehensively “deconstructed” the numerous problems with the career offender
guideline in a 2010 paper.295 The typical profile of a career offender is someone who
commits a low-level federal drug offense and has two prior state convictions for
minor drug offenses.296 Before the guidelines were enacted, a person with two prior
drug offenses on his record who was charged federally with possessing with intent
to distribute 50 grams of heroin would be facing 37 to 46 months.297 That is
approximately the same sentence the person would face under the guidelines without
application of the career offender provision.298 Under the career offender guideline,
however, the person’s guideline range skyrockets to 210 to 262 months.299 Because
Congress directed the Commission to set career offender guideline ranges at or near
the statutory maximum, the Commission did not rely on pre-guidelines sentencing
practices or employ an empirical approach when it formulated the career offender
guideline.300 As a result, under Kimbrough’s rubric, the career offender guideline
“cannot be assumed to be a ‘rough approximation’ . . . of § 3553(a)’s objectives.”301
The guideline also “defines the class of career offenders . . . much more broadly than
the statute requires.”302 In particular, it includes numerous drug offenses not listed
in the relevant statute, providing only a “blanket post-hoc justification” for doing
so.303
Next, judges should account for the fact that the Commission now disagrees
with applying the career offender guideline to people who are “drug trafficking
only” career offenders and has recommended that Congress remove them from the
relevant statute.304 In a 2016 report to Congress, the Commission concluded that the
guideline should “differentiate between career offenders with different types of
criminal records, and is best focused on those offenders who have committed at least
294
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one ‘crime of violence.’”305 The Commission emphasized that reforming the career
offender directive to exclude “drug trafficking” only career offenders “would help
ensure that federal sentences better account for the severity of the offenders’ prior
records, protect the public, and avoid undue severity for certain less culpable
offenders.”306
In its report, the Commission acknowledged several additional problems with
the career offender guideline. First, it pegs punishment to the offense’s statutory
maximum, which can lead to absurd results.307 For most federal drug offenses, the
statutory maximum—determined by the 1986 Act—is life in prison.308 As a result,
“[c]ontrary to what might be expected,” the career offender guideline has “a
significantly greater sentencing impact” on drug-trafficking only career offenders
because drug offenses have much higher statutory maximum penalties than many
violent offenses.309 For example, people who are convicted under the “primary drug
trafficking statute”—21 U.S.C. § 841—face a statutory maximum penalty of life
imprisonment, which correlates with the highest possible career offender offense
level under the guidelines—level 37.310 Coupled with Criminal History Category VI
and without any departures and adjustments, that yields a guideline range of 36 years
to life.311 On the flip side, the federal offense of robbery—also a career offender
predicate—has a statutory maximum penalty of 20 years and therefore the career
offender offense level is 32 under the guidelines and the resulting guideline range is
210 to 262 months.312 This result makes no sense. Second, the Commission found
that “drug trafficking only” career offenders are not “meaningfully different” from
other people convicted of federal drug offenses who are sentenced under the drug
guidelines.313 Thus, they should not “categorically be subject to the significant
increases in penalties required by the career offender directive.”314 One example of
this is that “drug trafficking only” career offenders recidivate at a lower rate than
305
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career offenders who are charged with a “crime of violence” or have such an offense
on their record.315
The Commission did not make its recommendation lightly. Its exhaustive 64page report analyzed data and incorporated feedback from judges, practitioners,
academics, and other interest groups.316 The report was sparked in part by “growing
criticisms” about the career offender guideline and the resulting “overly severe
penalties” for certain career offenders, which led to “increased departures and
variances from the guidelines.”317 As an example, in United States v. Newhouse, the
district court sentenced a “drug trafficking only” career offender to a greatly-reduced
sentence, explaining in a written opinion that the guideline range went from 70 to
87 months to “a staggering and mind-numbing 262 to 327 months” on the basis of
two prior drug convictions that arose out of a single drug raid.318 This is exactly the
sort of judicial feedback loop that the Supreme Court envisioned in Rita.319
After the report, judges find themselves in a “space in which the Commission
disagrees with its own Guidelines as applied” for “drug trafficking only” career
offenders, with no timeline for when Congress might act on the Commission’s
reform recommendation.320 Legislators need to hear from judges. So far, judges’
criticisms of the career offender guideline in “drug trafficking only” cases have
largely focused on its application in an individual case,321 with some also
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acknowledging “a quasi-categorical policy disagreement with it when applied to
low-level, non-violent drug addicts.”322
Judges’ criticisms up to this point fall short and understate the problems with
the career offender guideline. Judges should not be imposing high sentences under
a guideline with which the Commission itself disagrees. Instead, judges should
categorically reject the career offender guideline in all “drug trafficking only” career
offender cases on policy grounds, before turning to an individualized analysis of the
§ 3553(a) factors. More specifically, judges should take the following steps at
sentencing: (1) calculate the guidelines applying the career offender provision, to
comply with Booker and its progeny; (2) lodge a categorical policy disagreement
with the career offender guideline, citing the Commission’s 2016 Report; (3)
calculate the guidelines that would apply notwithstanding the career offender
guideline; and (4) analyze the § 3553(a) factors to reach a sentence that is “sufficient,
but not greater than necessary” to achieve the purposes of sentencing.323 Judges
should then explain the rationale for their policy disagreement in a written opinion
to shape the sentencing common law and provide feedback to the Commission and
Congress.
V. CONCLUSION
Given that Congress is perennially mired in tough-on-crime politics,
substantive federal drug law reform is highly unlikely for the foreseeable future.
Federal judges must not wait for Congress to change the law. Instead, judges must
acknowledge that the federal drug laws were enacted at the height of the War on
Drugs, have led to significant racial disparities, and have contributed to the mass
incarceration of people of color. In light of these realities, judges should use the
substantial discretion vested in them to promote reform at both ends of the detention
crisis, at bail and at sentencing. Judges should release more people on bail, reduce
more sentences based on categorical disagreements with the drug guidelines and the
career offender guideline, and write more opinions on these pivotal issues. If judges
use their discretion in this way they can reduce racial disparities, ameliorate mass
incarceration, and perhaps even prompt Congress to take more decisive action.
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